Pierre-André Chiappori (Columbia University/Minister of Finance and Economy of Monaco)
Ito International Research Center 3F, Seminar Room 本郷7-3-1, 東京都, JapanTitle: Matching on income: theory and application to Dutch data
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Title: Matching on income: theory and application to Dutch data
Title: "Organizational Change and Reference-Dependent Preferences"
Title: "Decentralized Multilateral Bargaining"
Title: "Matroid Search Problems and Greedy Pandora’s Rule"
Title: Whistleblowing (joint with Ayca Kaya and Anne-Katrin Roesler) Abstract: We study a dynamic game of whistleblowing among agents who independently receive evidence over time. Evidence arrives privately, and once an agent is informed, she may choose at any moment to disclose it (i.e., whistleblow) or to delay reporting. Reporting entails a cost (e.g., risk of retaliation) but yields a benefit if corroborated by another report. Agents prefer to corroborate existing reports rather than be the first to disclose. If no other agent holds evidence at the time of report, the payoff from reporting is negative. As a result, agents delay in hopes of free-riding on others’ disclosures and […]